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SUPERPRIORITY OF REMEDIATION LIENS: A CURE TO
THE VIRUS OF BLIGHT
Marilyn L. Uzdavines*
INTRODUCTION
Blight in a neighborhood is like a virus that spreads throughout the
community. If left unchecked, that virus will destroy the community.
In cities like Detroit, the spread of blight has ruined the economy and
led to a dramatic plunge in population and the underfunding of city
services.' Blighted communities have transformed into vast swathes
of abandoned properties that attract crime and create hazardous
conditions to anyone who dares to remain in them. Although cities
like Detroit have received exceptional media attention due to their
overwhelming problems, blight continues to affect Detroit and
communities in many states across the United States. There is,
however, a cure that can protect cities against blight's spread: an
Assistant Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center. I am grateful to Professors Joel Mintz and Kathy Cerminara for their
thoughtful comments. I also truly appreciate the comments I received on this article
from Professor Tamara F. Lawson and all of the attendees of the South Florida
Developing Ideas Workshop on June 9, 2015, of which I was privileged to be a part. I
would also like to thank Dina Rosenbaum for her valuable research assistance.
Finally, I would like to thank my husband for his unfailing support.
1. "Detroit has more than 140,000 blighted properties, and approximately 78,000
'abandoned and blighted' structures, some 38,000 of which are considered dangerous.
In 2012, the City's violent crime rate was five times the national average, and higher
than any U.S. city with a population greater than 200,000." Christine Sgarlata Chung,
Zombieland / The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated with Pensions, Benefits,
and Municipal Securities Never Die... and How They Are Killing Cities Like Detroit,
41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 773 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
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effectively drafted state statute that provides superpriority status2 to
remediation liens.
3
Ten years ago, after Hurricane Katrina caused extensive losses to
the Gulf Coast, New Orleans was faced with the daunting task of
rebuilding amidst an overwhelming number of blighted and
abandoned flood-damaged properties. That city's efforts have
resulted in major successes in large part due to the State of
Louisiana's wise enactment of legislation that empowers New
Orleans, and other Louisiana local governments, to give superpriority
status to remediation liens.4 Unfortunately, fewer than half of the
fifty states have a similar statute in place that gives local
governments the power to give remediation liens superpriority
status;5 and in the minority of states that have codified superpriority
status for remediation liens, there are a wide variety of approaches in
how they handle the procedure for doing so.
This article advocates superlien status for remediation liens as a
means of battling urban blight. In it, I assert that it is essential for
states to have a state statute in place to remediate blight so that when
devastation begins to occur in a community, whether caused by an
economic or natural disaster, local governments are equipped to
curtail the blight as quickly as possible.
This article explores the disparate approaches of the minority of
states that currently codify a procedure for the superpriority of
remediation liens and outlines the essential attributes of a model
remediation lien statute. I will contend that hese proposed attributes
2. A state or local government will require many tools to help cure blight in a
community. However, this article will focus on superpriority of remediation liens as
the most effective tool. For a discussion on other tools that can be used to cure blight,
see Marilyn L. Uzdavines, Barking Dogs: Code Enforcement Is All Bark and No Bite
(Unless the Inspectors Have Assault Rifles), 54 WASHBURN L.J. 161 (2014). For
example, some other tools that have been effective in curing blight are community
collaboration models, land banks, and state receiver statutes.
3. The term "remediation lien" will be used in this article to describe any type of lien
that is created as a result of a local government rehabilitating a blighted property.
This term is meant to include code enforcement liens, nuisance abatement liens, weed
liens or any other descriptive term used to convey this meaning.
4. Allison Plyer & Elaine Ortiz, Benchmarks for Blight: How Much Blight Does New
Orleans Have?, THE DATA CTR. (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.datacenterresearch.org/r
eports.analysis/benchmarks-for-blight/. Also, New Orleans has established
"BlightSTAT," a system used by leadership and the community to identify and
remediate blight efficiently. BlightSTAT defines procedures from identification
through possession of blighted properties and tracks multiple statistics on blight in
New Orleans. BlightSTAT, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, http://www.nola.gov/performance
-and-accountability/reports/blightstat/ (last updated Dec. 8, 2015, 5:39:33 PM).
5. See infra note 36.
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should be replicated in states that currently have not addressed the
need for a remediation statute with superpriority status. Additionally,
I will argue states that currently have a statute in place should follow
the suggestions that I will present as a guide to amending those
statutes that are too cumbersome or poorly drafted and ineffective.
Part I of the article will present an overview of liens on real
property including how priority of liens is determined and impact of
lien priorities on property values. I will then explain how and why
some liens, including remediation liens, are granted special priority.
Part II of the article will focus on the minority of states that currently
have a state statute addressing superpriority of remediation liens. In
particular, I will examine three crucial attributes of those statutes.
Part III of this article will address the main objections to giving
superpriority status to a remediation lien, including constitutional
objections and some practical objections raised by lenders. Part IV of
this article will recount a cautionary tale of what may happen when a
state fails to address this issue, and it will propose model attributes of
an effective remediation statute with superpriority status.
I. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON LIENS AND SUPERPRIORITY
LIENS
Local governments, usually through the efforts of a code
enforcement department, typically have the power to fine non-
compliant property owners and eventually place a lien on a property
that violates the local housing code.6 This is an important tool for a
local government that allows the municipality to rehabilitate blighted
homes that pose a threat to the community and recoup the expenses it
incurs in the process. The local government is authorized to do this
in order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its residents.7 If
the local government's fines or expenses for rehabilitating the
property are not paid, the local government can foreclose the lien.8
Typically, however, the threat of the lien is sufficient to encourage
owners to bring their property back into compliance.9 The goal is to
get the homeowner to comply with the housing code without the need
6. MARTIN G. COLLINS, THE ART OF CODE ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 5 (2012).
7. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that "[p]ublic safety, public
health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more
conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal
affairs").
8. ALAN MALLACH, RESTORING PROnLEM PROPERTIES: A GUIDE TO NEW JERSEY'S
ABANDONED PROPERTY TOOLS 25-26 (Annu Mangat ed., 2005).
9. Id. at 47.
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for foreclosure, which wastes valuable time and scarce resources for
all parties involved.'0
Foreclosure carries its own set of procedures. These procedures
range from a full civil suit to the more streamlined non-judicial sales.
Nonetheless, the end result is always the same: the foreclosing
party-in this case the municipality or state under which the code
enforcement agency derives its authority-takes possession and
ownership of the property."
The nature of the resulting governmental ownership depends
entirely on lien priority. If the lien that was foreclosed had superior
status to all other liens, then the purchaser at the foreclosure sale
takes the property free and clear of any other encumbrances,
including first mortgages.'2 If, however, the lien is inferior-as is the
case with most remediation liens-a purchaser at a foreclosure sale
will have an ownership interest in a property that remains heavily
encumbered by the first mortgage, and the new owner will have no
equity in the property. 13
The common law rule of "first in time, first in right" has been
codified in the majority of states through recording statutes.14 As a
general matter, this idea-that earlier recorded liens will have priority
over later recorded liens-is uniformly accepted throughout he
country.5 In the event of a foreclosure, higher priority liens receive
proceeds from a sale before junior liens.16 Also, junior lienholders,
should they choose to foreclose, cannot eliminate senior liens in a
foreclosure sale.7 The result in these cases is that even if a junior
lienholder decides to foreclose the property, the party who receives
the property through the sale takes possession with the senior liens
10. Id.
11. Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 1169, 1193 (2008).
12. See, e.g., Chase Plaza Condo. Ass'n v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166,
173 (D.C. 2014) (explaining the "general principle" of lien priority in foreclosure
law).
13. This result may leave the local government, after incurring further expenses in
foreclosing its lien, unable to sell the property because it is still encumbered by the
first mortgage.
14. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-109 (West 2015).
15. "A lien that is first in time generally has priority and is entitled to prior satisfaction of
the property it binds." Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate Bank of Oak Forest, 734
N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
16. Chase Plaza Condo. Ass"n, 98 A.3d at 172.
17. Id. at 176 ("[F]oreclosure on a lien with greater priority extinguishes liens with lower
priority.").
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still encumbering the property."8 This makes foreclosure for junior
lienholders an unattractive option. Lien priority, therefore, directly
impacts the true value of a lien.
For example, consider a property valued at $500,000, with two
liens-a first mortgage for $300,000, and a money judgment for
$100,000. The money judgment lienholder can foreclose the
property, but that party will take the property subject to the $300,000
mortgage. In this scenario, if the holder of the first mortgage
forecloses, the money judgment lienholder will still have a reasonable
expectation of receiving the amount it is owed because the value of
the property exceeds the combined value of the liens. However, if
the value of the property were to decrease to $290,000 for example, if
the first mortgage foreclosed, the money judgment lienholder would
not receive any foreclosure sale proceeds because the sale proceeds
would not even cover what the mortgagee was owed. Code
enforcement liens often find themselves in just such a subordinate
position-holding a legally recorded document that has no value.
Notwithstanding the customary first in time system, many states
have passed statutes that provide exceptions to this rule.19 State
governments have created superliens that can increase their priority
to become superior to an earlier recorded lien. Superliens are not a
recent concept; cases as far back as the 19th century hold that some
liens are entitled to superlien status.20
For example, it is standard in most states that a property tax lien is
superior to all other liens regardless of when the lien was attached to
the property.2' Moreover, there are other liens that, while not having
superiority over all liens, are afforded limited priority.22  For
example, in some states, a mechanic's lien enjoys priority over prior
18. See id. at 173.
19. Some examples of liens given some level of superpriority status are community
association liens like condominium and homeowner associations, see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 718.116(5)(a), 720.3085(1) (West 2015); mechanics liens, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 60.04.061 (West 2015) (granting priority to mechanics liens recorded after prior
liens provided the work upon which the lien is based began before the prior lien was
recorded), attomey fee liens, Adco Serv., Inc. v. Graphic Color Plate, 347 A.2d 549,
551 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), and environmental liens, see MASS GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West 2010) (establishing a superlien on commercial property
where the state conducts environmental cleanup).
20. See Glendon Co. v. Townsend, 120 Mass. 346, 347 (1876).
21. Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 748, 770-71
n. 129 (2000) (compiling statutes).
22. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 8450(a) (West 2015); FLA. STAT. § 718.1 16(l)(b), (5)(a) (West
2015).
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recorded liens, but only over those liens recorded after a notice of
commencement of work by the mechanic lienholder.2 3  Finally,
another group of liens may be given priority over all other liens
except tax liens, essentially giving them co-equal status with tax
liens.
24
Public policy supports the use of superliens. The theory is that
prejudicing a senior lien's priority is warranted to protect the interest
of a junior lienholder.25 For example, policy supports superpriority
status for property tax liens so that the state may be able to receive its
due tax in order to obtain the money necessary to operate the
government and provide local citizens needed services such as
schools, police, firefighters, etc.26 Whether the tax lien was the last to
attach to a property is irrelevant because this tax is crucial to the
operation of the government, so the tax lien is treated as the most
superior lien on the property.27 In another example, condominium
associations in Florida are given limited superpriority.28 The public
policy justification behind this limited statutory protection is that the
associations rely on the monthly or annual community service fees
from their owners to operate.29 The fees collected from those owners
are used to pay for utilities, waste removal, salaries of the staff, and
maintenance of the grounds.3" If no limited superpriority status was
given to a condominium association's lien, the association would
routinely fail to recover the judgment amount owed to them from the
foreclosure sale proceeds. Such a result would cause turmoil for the
condominium association's finances and potentially bankrupt the
association altogether.3' Instead, the limited superpriority status for
23. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 8450.
24. Discussed below, Louisiana has codified superlien status for liens recorded by code
enforcement to secure payment of remediation costs and fines.
25. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 753, 755, 770-71.
26. Id. at 753, 755.
27. Id. at 770.
28. Condominium liens are protected against first mortgage foreclosures up to twelve
months or one percent of the original mortgage. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(1)(b)(1)
(West 2015 & Supp. 2016).
29. See Peter P. Hargitai, Gotcha! Associations Corner Mortgages for Past Due




30. See Gabriela Islas, HOA Fees: What Do They Cover?, QUICKEN LOANS: ZING! (Apr.
11, 2011), http://www.quickenloans.com/blog/what-do-hoa-fees-cover.
31. Condominium associations will forego placing a lien on the property if it will be
eliminated by a mortgage foreclosure; with no recourse to collect assessments,
expenses exceed revenue and associations are forced to explore bankruptcy. Joseph
408 Vol. 45
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condominium association liens benefits all owners in the
condominium association, a result that the state of Florida considers
important.32
In the context of remediating blight, superlien statutes generally
seek to place remediation liens as top priority, co-equal with tax
liens.33 This creates a heightened incentive for owners or lenders to
remediate the problems with their properties before the local
governing body has to step in to remedy the violations. Rather than
lose their security interest or equity altogether, lenders or owners are
thus encouraged to immediately improve their property, rather than
leave the property in a blighted state, until they can finally sell the
property to other parties.34
Because the goal of the remediation superlien statute is to
incentivize action on the part of the owner or superior lienholders
(i.e., to cure the blight before the superlien must be enforced) a
discussion of the steps leading up to the perfecting of the lien is
important. Additionally, the level of priority the lien is given, and the
procedure required to enforce or collect the lien, are important to
realizing of the goal of the statute. If the process breaks down at any
point, the result may be that the local government's superlien will
still be devalued or even completely negated.35 The entire process,
from identifying the violation to enforcing a superlien, must thus be
evaluated to ensure that the desired goal of curing the blight occurs as
efficiently as possible. It is to these important matters that his article
next turns.
II. ONLY A MINORITY OF STATES CODIFY REMEDIATION
LIEN SUPERPRIORITY.
As noted above, out of the fifty states, fewer than half have statutes
that address the superpriority of remediation liens.36 Each of the
Dobrian, Condo Conundrum: Condominium Associations Hit Hard by Foreclosures
Consider Bankruptcy, J. PROP. MGMT., May-June 2010, at 30, 32.
32. See William C. Matthews, Comment, Aventura Management, LLC v. Spiaggia Ocean
Condominium Association: Condominium Associations Beware, 66 FLA. L. REV.
1731, 1743 (2014).
33. See infra notes 68, 75, 86-87 and accompanying text. See generally discussion infra
Part II.B.
34. See discussion infra notes 182-83, 203 and accompanying text.
35. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
36. See ALA. CODE §§ 45-37A-41(d), 230(d), 251.53 (2015); ALA. CODE § 11-67-8
(LexisNexis 2008); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-499(E) (Supp. 2015); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30-15-401(1)(a)(I)(A) (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-148aa
(West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 4602, 4604 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-
2016 409
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states that do address this issue, do so in a slightly different manner.37
Evidently, few states have made an effort to compare their approach
with those of other states, nor have they attempted to adopt best
practices.
Within the group of states that do address the superpriority of
remediation liens, there exist three distinct attributes that are central
to the operation of each statute. The first of those attributes is
whether the statute mandates that the local governments' remediation
liens have superpriority status, or merely authorizes local
governments to create superpriority status for their remediation
liens.38 The latter group requires that the local government take some
additional action to enable the superpriority status for remediation
liens, while the former group requires no additional action at the local
level to achieve superpriority status for remediation liens.3 9 The
second attribute that I will discuss is what level of priority the
9(b)(1) (2014); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-20-15(a) (West Supp. 2015); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 82.720(1) (West 2006); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(A)(1) (Supp. 2015);
MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV'T § 5-205(d)(1) (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
266.335(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:9(I) (LexisNexis
2010); N.M. STAT ANN. § 3-36-2 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §
1307(1) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-193(a) (Supp. 2014); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11 §§ 22-11l(A)(6), -112.4(B)(7) (West Supp. 2016); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 31-15-30(6) (2007); TEX. Loc. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 214.001(o) (West Supp. 2015);
VT. STAT. ANN tit. 24, § 2291(24) (Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
35.80.030(l)(h) (West Supp. 2015).
37. If our federal system of government is intended, at least in part, to
permit experimentation among our various states in achieving the
best forms of governance, then there should be clear models of
excellence and efficiency in the collection of this tax. Instead,
there are over 150 different systems in the United States for
collecting the property tax. Most states have at least two entirely
different approaches for enforcing payment of the property tax,
with one procedure having its origins in the mid-nineteenth
century and an alternative second procedure, equally available for
use by local governments, having been developed in the middle of
the twentieth century. Other states leave the enforcement of the
property tax to local governments, with little consistency in
procedures as one moves from city to city and from county to
county across a state.
Alexander, supra note 21, at 748; see also discussion infra Part IV.C. 1.
38. Alexander, supra note 21, at 770-72.
39. The New Hampshire statute is self-executing, stating that a governing body's lien for
costs shall be a lien levied and collected as tax liens. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-
B:9. On the other hand, Georgia's statute only authorizes counties and municipalities
to adopt ordinances establishing remediation liens with superpriority. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 41-2-9.
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remediation lien is given.40 Whether the lien is to be superior to all
other liens except tax liens, co-equal with tax liens, or given some
other limited type of priority over liens is an essential determination
that must be made in designing the statute. The final attribute that I
will address in this section is how the remediation lien is to be
enforced.
The disparity in methods and classifications may seem
inconsequential when one considers the statutes' effect on priority
alone, since remediation lien statutes effectively establish such liens
as superior to all other liens except ad valorem property taxes.
However, superpriority liens are best seen as a means, not an end.
Their goal must be to enable local governments to cure blight in their
jurisdictions. As we shall see, when considered in light of that
purpose, many currently existing superlien statutes are regrettably
ineffective.
A. States May Either Mandate that Remediation Liens Have
Superpriority Status or They May Authorize Local Governments to
Decide Whether Remediation Liens Will Have Superpriority
Status.
1. States that Mandate Superpriority Status for Remediation Liens
Some state statutes set forth a system for remediation of blight that
applies to all local governments throughout the state.42 Along with
the process for identifying and remediating blighted property, these
statutes delineate the procedure for local governments to recoup their
expenses through a lien on the property.43 These measures apply
statewide without the need for a local government to enact any other
law.44
In this system, the statute will typically first define what constitutes
blight.45 Two typical components in analyzing whether a property is
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. See infra Part II.C.
42. North Carolina, for example, gives every city the authority to abate conditions
dangerous to the public, and lien the property for its costs, the priority of which is
equal to ad valorem taxes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-193(a) to (b) (2010).
43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:1 to 15 (LexisNexis 2010).
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-193(a).
45. Definition of blighted properties is set forth in usually one of two places-a
definitions section of the statute, or in the section of the statute that authorizes local
governments to effect remediation of impaired properties. New Hampshire defines
"hazardous building" in a definitions section of the statute. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 155-B:1(II). South Carolina, however, defines blight in the same statute that
2016
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blighted are the structure of the building upon the property and the
condition of the premises as a whole. Common terms for a structure
that qualifies for remediation are "ruined" and "dilapidated.
46
Generally, statutes are concerned with buildings that pose an inherent
danger to occupants.47  For the premises to qualify for remediation,
statutes look not just to safety, adding public interests like "comfort,
health, peace or safety" to query the status of the property.48 Terms
like "garbage" and "rubbish" are often used to describe conditions on
properties that are eligible for remediation.49  Additionally, states
vary on whether they use the term code enforcement violation or
nuisance abatement.50 In some states, blight and nuisance are used
establishes the power for municipalities to remediate blighted property. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 31-15-20 (2007) (defining the power for municipalities to "exercise its
police powers to repair, close or demolish" any dwelling structure that it determines is
"unfit for human habitation due to (a) dilapidation, (b) defects increasing the hazards
of fire, accidents or other calamities, (c) lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities
or (d) other conditions rendering such dwellings unsafe or insanitary, dangerous or
detrimental to the health, safety or morals").
Washington's statute states:
A "blight on the surrounding neighborhood" is any property,
dwelling, building, or structure that meets any two of the
following factors: (1) If a dwelling, building, or structure exists on
the property, the dwelling, building, or structure has not been
lawfully occupied for a period of one year or more; (2) the
property, dwelling, building, or structure constitutes a threat to the
public health, safety, or welfare as determined by the executive
authority of the county, city, or town, or the designee of the
executive authority; or (3) the property, dwelling, building, or
structure is or has been associated with illegal drug activity during
the previous twelve months.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.80A.010 (West 2003).
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-18-5 (2004). Additional terms commonly used are those that
convey a hazard, failure to maintain the structure, failure to abide by the fire or
building code, abandonment, or unhealthy conditions.
47. See id. ("[T]he governing body of a municipality may by resolution find that the
ruined, damaged, and dilapidated building, structure or premise is a menace to the
public comfort, health, peace or safety ... 
48. See, e.g., id.
49. Arkansas authorizes its municipalities to cut weeds; to remove garbage, rubbish, and
other unsightly and unsanitary articles and things upon the property; and to eliminate,
fill up, or remove stagnant pools of water or any other unsanitary thing, place, or
condition which might become a breeding place for mosquitoes, flies, and germs
harmful to the health of the community. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-901 (West 2015).
50. Compare KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 82.710 (West 2006), with ALA. CODE § 11-67-10
(2015).
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interchangeably,51 while other states bifurcate remediation of blight
and nuisance abatement.5 2  Regardless of what each state calls the
problem, the statutes encompass the remediation of the violation and
the need for superpriority to protect the local government.
Once the definition of a blighted property is established, these
statutes typically set forth the procedure a local government must
undertake to begin remediation of the property. The first step is
defining who within the local government determines that a property
is blighted and in need of remediation.5 3 Some statutes leave that
determination to the local governing body, while others define
specific members of local government who are authorized to
determine that a property is blighted.54 For example, in New Mexico,
51. Georgia makes little distinction between nuisances and blight remediation. The
Georgia statute that sets forth the required provisions local governments must include
in their local ordinances designed to protect the health and safety of its community
along with the superpriority of remediation liens is located within the chapter titled
"Nuisances." GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-9 (2014).
52. Virginia defines procedures specifically for blighted properties while maintaining a
separate statute for nuisances. "[A]ny locality may, by ordinance, declare any
blighted property as defined in § 36-3 to constitute a nuisance, and thereupon abate
the nuisance pursuant to § 15.2-900 or § 15.2-1115." VA. CODE ANN. § 36-49.1:1
(Supp. 2015); see also id. § 15.2-900 (2012); id. § 15.2-1115 (Supp. 2015).
53. See infra notes 54-55.
54. New Hampshire contains a general charge to the "governing body of any city or
town." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:2 (LexisNexis 2010). Virginia places the
authority to determine blight with "[t]he chief executive or designee of the locality or
authority." VA. CODE ANN. § 36-49.1:1. Vermont allows determination by "a
municipal building inspector, health officer, or fire marshal." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2291(24) (Supp. 2015). Arkansas specifically permits notice of violations to be
given by a "(1) Police officer employed by the city or town; (2) City or town attorney;
or (3) Code enforcement officer employed by the city or town." ARK. CODE ANN. §
14-54-903(d) (Supp. 2015). Georgia's statute creates a procedure by which residents
may institute action against a blighted property by filing a request with the designated
public officer:
[W]henever a request is filed with the public officer by a public
authority or by at least five residents of the municipality or by five
residents of the unincorporated area of the county if the property
in question is located in the unincorporated area of the county
charging that any dwelling, building, structure, or property is unfit
for human habitation or for commercial, industrial, or business
use and not in compliance with applicable codes; is vacant and
being used in connection with the commission of drug crimes; or
constitutes an endangerment to the public health or safety as a
result of unsanitary or unsafe conditions, the public officer shall
make an investigation or inspection of the specific dwelling,
building, structure, or property.
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the governing body of the municipality must pass a resolution
declaring that a property requires remediation of dilapidated
structures or emoval of debris."
Regardless of how the determination is made, every jurisdiction
requires some form of notice before proceeding with remediation.
Some jurisdictions only require notice to the property owner 6; others
require notice to all interested parties.7 Some states require notice
pursuant to civil procedure,58 while others permit certified mailing.
59
GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-9 (a)(3).
Delaware has created a public entity in each community called the "slum clearance
and redevelopment authority." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4503 (2009). Each local
government must pass a resolution approving such an authority within its community,
or, alternatively, granting the equivalent rights to the community itself or a housing
authority. Id. The powers of the authority are broadly stated and include the exercise
of eminent domain and remediation of blight. Id. § 4516.
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-18-5(A) (LexisNexis 2004).
56. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.715 (West 2006) ("Any person who violates the
nuisance code shall be cited for the violation and shall receive notice of the
violation."); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 36-49.1:1 ("No spot blight abatement plan
shall be effective until notice has been sent to the property owner or owners of record
.... .).
57. In order to secure superpriority status for a remediation lien, some states require
notice to all interested parties. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-903(c)(7)(A) (Supp.
2015) ("If the city or town wishes to secure a priority clean-up lien, it shall provide
seven (7) business days' notice to lienholders before undertaking any work at the
property."); DALL., TEX. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 27-16.8(e)(2) (2015) ("The city's
lien for the expenses is a privileged lien subordinate only to tax liens, if each
mortgagee and lienholder is given notice and an opportunity to repair, demolish,
vacate, or secure the structure, or relocate the occupants of the structure, whichever
applies.").
58. New Hampshire's statute calls for service pursuant to the rules of civil procedure,
including provision for publication in the event the owner is absent:
The order shall be served upon the owner of record, or his agent if
an agent is in charge of the building, and upon the occupying
tenant, if there is one, and upon all lien holders of record, in the
manner provided for service of a summons in a civil action. If the
owner cannot be found, the order shall be served upon him by
posting it at the main entrance to the building and by 4 weeks'
publication in a published newspaper of the municipality if there
is one, otherwise in a newspaper of general circulation in the state.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:4 (LexisNexis 2010); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-
18-5(B) (LexisNexis 2004).
59. For example, Delaware's statute provides the following:
For purposes of this subsection, the mailing of a certified letter,
return receipt requested, at least 30 days prior to commencement
of any exterior improvements, to the last known address of the
record owner, owners or lien holders and notifying same of the
address of the property to be improved, the condition of the
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States vary on the step that follows notice. Some require a hearing
before a court60 or a local government board.6' Others treat the
process as a civil court action, mandating that he person served file
an answer to the allegation that the property is blighted.2 Some
require the person served to contest the determination actively, either
by filing a petition with the court or an objection with the board of
the local government.63 In all of these models, however, a court or
authorized party must determine whether remediation shall take
place,' and many states offer appellate procedures for property
owners to challenge determinations that blight exists.65
property and the legal right of the municipality or political
subdivision to obtain a judgment against the owner and a lien
against the property after completion of the exterior
improvements, shall be deemed sufficient notice.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 4603(a) (2009).
60. In Georgia, a notice of violation is always followed by a court hearing: "The
summons shall notify the interested parties that a hearing will be held before a court
of competent jurisdiction as determined by Code Section 41-2-5, at a date and time
certain and at a place within the county or municipality where the property is located."
GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-9(a)(3) (2014).
61. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.80.030(1)(c) (West Supp. 2014) ("Such
complaint shall contain a notice that a hearing will be held before the board or officer,
at a place therein fixed, not less than ten days nor more than thirty days after the
serving of the complaint."); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4524 (2009); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 82.710(3) (West 2006).
62. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:6 to 8. The person served with an order that the
property requires remediation may serve an answer denying the allegations; failure to
do so results in a default and a court order allowing the local government to proceed
with remediation. If the person does file an answer, the parties then proceed in the
same manner as a civil action in the state. Id.
63. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-15-70 (2007) ("Any person affected by an order issued by
a public officer may within sixty days after the posting and service of the order
petition the circuit court for an injunction restraining the public officer from carrying
out the provisions of the order .... "); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 82.715 (West Supp.
2015) ("The notice of violation shall represent a determination that a violation has
been committed, and that determination shall be final unless contested.").
64. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-9 (a)(4)(A)-(B) (2014).
65. Kentucky, for example, provides that:
[a]n appeal from the hearing board's determination may be made
to the District Court of the county in which the city is located
within thirty (30) days of the board's determination. The appeal
shall be initiated by the filing of a complaint and a copy of the
board's order in the same manner as any civil action under the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 82.715(4). Arizona requires some provision for appeal to both
the notice of remediation and the subsequent assessments for thecost of remediation:
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Once a property is deemed to qualify for remediation, statutes
typically give the property owner reasonable time to comply with the
order.66 Once that time expires without remediation, the local
government is authorized to cause the repair or removal to be
completed pursuant to the order.67 Once completed, the local
government is authorized by statute to record a lien for the expenses
incurred in remediating the property.68  This remediation lien
automatically has superpriority status because it was mandated
through the relevant state statute.69
2. States that Merely Authorize Superpriority Status for Remediation
Liens
Not all states that address this issue provide for mandatory
superpriority status for local government remediation liens. Some
states simply authorize local governments to enact legislation that
sets forth the policies and procedures for remediation of blight and
the superpriority of the lien, if they choose to do so.7" Unless the
local government takes this additional step, it does not have the
necessary legal authority to achieve the goal of a remediation
superlien.71
There are three different ways that states merely authorize local
governments to enact superpriority ordinances for remediation liens.
First, some states give a general consent to the local government that
superpriority is permitted, and at most give general guidelines that
must be followed to achieve this goal.72 For example, Kentucky
authorizes local governments to enact a nuisance code73, which
requires notice to be "reasonably calculated to inform the person of
the nature of the violation,' 74 and declares liens perfected pursuant to
the local government's enacted code to enjoy superpriority over all
"Provisions for appeal on both the notice and the assessments, unless the removal or
abatement is ordered by a court." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-499(A)(2) (Supp. 2015).
66. ALA. CODE § 45-37A-41(b) (2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17980.7(c)(1)
(West Supp. 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:3 (LexisNexis 2010); see WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 35.80.030(1)(0.
67. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.3605(4)(a)-(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). But see
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:7 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring a motion to the court
to enforce the order for remediation.).
68. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 266.335(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
69. Id. § 266.335 (3)(d).
70. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-15-401 (West Supp. 2015).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 82.700-725 (West 2006).
73. Id. § 82.705.
74. Id. § 82.715.
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liens except state taxes.75 Under this system, local governments have
discretion, within the statutory guidelines, to create the procedures by
which remediation liens are perfected.
Second, some states authorize local governments to create
remediation liens with superpriority status, but only if the local
government has enacted legislation with certain terms.76  For
example, Georgia authorizes blight remediation ordinances by local
governments, but requires certain provisions to be included. Georgia
requires each local government to appoint a public officer to whom
complaints of blight may be registered, and establishes with
specificity the investigatory findings of a public officer and the
procedures that must be followed in response to a complaint of
blight.77  Vermont, in contrast, provides for superpriority of
remediation liens, "provided, however, that the town, city, or
incorporated village has adopted rules to determine the habitability of
a building, including provisions for notice in accordance with 32
V.S.A. § 5252(3) to the building's owner prior to incurring expenses
and including provisions for an administrative appeals process. "78
Finally, a small number of states only authorize certain types of
local jurisdictions (such as "first-class" cities) within their state to
enact local ordinances for blight removal and superpriority status for
remediation liens.79 For example, Washington permits "[fjirst-class
cities" (those with a population of over ten thousand at the time of its
organization or re-organization) to "provide for ... the removing of
garbage, debris, grass, weeds, and brush on property in the city."80 It
also gives a general authorization to first-class cities to establish by
general ordinance the procedure for collecting its costs.8 Included in
the power granted to first-class cities is the ability to declare its costs
a lien on the property, to be "collected in such a manner as is
prescribed in the ordinance.82 The practical effect of this statute is
that a first-class city in Washington has the discretion to enact an
ordinance defining the process by which it will remediate weeds,
75. Id. § 82.720 (West Supp. 2015).
76. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-9 (2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:2575(B)(1) (2011).
77. GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-9.
78. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2291(24) (Supp. 2015).
79. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.22.3 10 (West 2003); see also LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:2575.1-2575.7 (2011 & Supp. 2015).
80. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35.01.010, .22.310 (West 2003).
81. Id. § 35.22.320. Washington is an example of statutes that give permission to its local
governments to remediate blight but refrains from including particular requirements
with respect to notice, determination and collection of costs.
82. Id.
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garbage or debris, declare that its costs are a lien upon the subject
property, and decide whether to establish that lien as having
superpriority.83 This privilege, however, is not afforded to the cities
that do not qualify as first-class cities.84
B. Level of Priority Given to Remediation Liens
Another attribute of remediation superlien statutes is the level of
priority that is assigned to the liens associated with the costs of
cleanup.85 States that elevate the priority of remediation liens will
usually either declare the lien to be co-equal with that of the ad
valorem property tax86 , or prior in status to all liens except the ad
valorem property tax.87  The difference between these last two
examples may appear negligible, but it is important nonetheless. If
the property tax lien remains superior to the remediation lien, then a
default and foreclosure of the property tax lien potentially eliminates
the security interest of the remediation lien.88 Carefully drafted
statutes will contain language protecting the remediation lien in the
83. Washington also has enacted the "Community Renewal Law," an extensive act
designed to combat blighted areas. Id. § 35.81.005. This is just one of many
examples in which states have overlapping methods for curing blight in its
jurisdictions. The distinction between many of these statutes is that there are
provisions at the individual property level-like the removal of weeds or debris-and
at the neighborhood level-where entire blocks of properties are in constant state of
disrepair or danger. Where the former takes on the form of a code enforcement
action, the latter is typically characterized as a community renewal project, often
requiring board approval of plans and the exercise of eminent domain.
84. Id. § 35.01.010.
85. Georgia's statute states, "The lien shall be superior to all other liens on the property,
except liens for taxes to which the lien shall be inferior .. " GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-
9 (2014); see also ALA. CODE § 45-37A-41(d) (2015). Arizona states the superpriority
for remediation liens with more specificity while maintaining primacy for property
taxes: "Any assessment recorded after July 15, 1996 is prior and superior to all other
liens, obligations, mortgages or other encumbrances, except liens for general taxes."
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-499(E) (Supp. 2015). "The lien shall be superior to all
other liens on the property except liens for taxes." ALA. CODE § 45-37A-41(d).
86. Nevada's statute requires any nuisance abatement ordinance enacted by a city council
to declare that the expense for removal of a nuisance is a lien on the subject property,
which must "[b]e coequal with the latest lien thereon to secure the payment of general
taxes." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 266.335(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2011). In Oklahoma's
statute on the treatment of abandoned buildings, the cost of the abatement process i
declared a lien, which "shall be coequal with the lien of ad valorem taxes and all other
taxes and special assessments and shall be prior and superior to all other titles and
liens against the property." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 22-112.4(B)(7) (West Supp.
2015).
87. ALA. CODE § 45-37-243.15 (2015); N.M. STAT ANN. § 3-36-2 (LexisNexis 2004).
88. ALA. CODE § 45-37-243.15 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-36-2 (LexisNexis 2004).
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event of a property tax foreclosure sale. For example, the Nevada
statute mandates that the lien must "[n]ot be subject to
extinguishment by the sale of any property because of the
nonpayment of general taxes."8 9 This approach, while maintaining
the primacy of the general property tax, effectively protects
remediation liens from losing their security interest should the owner
fail to pay the property tax.9°
The 2006 Nebraska case of INA Group, LLC v. Young9' provides a
useful illustration of what may occur when a statute fails to give a
remediation lien specific priority over a tax lien. Nebraska's statute
provided superpriority for local governments' special assessments,
which included what Nebraska calls "weed liens," over all prior liens
except general property taxes.92  No other statutory language
protected special assessments from the effects of a general tax
foreclosure sale.93 The question before the court was whether the
foreclosure of a general tax lien would extinguish the City's special
assessment liens.94 Because no statutory language existed to indicate
otherwise, the court held that the special assessment liens were
extinguished.95
A small number of states merge remediation costs into the property
tax.96 The costs are simply added to the tax roll of the prior year.97
89. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 266.335.
90. See id.
91. INA Grp., LLC v. Young, 716 N.W.2d 733 (Neb. 2006).
92. Id. at 736 ("Special assessments levied by cities, villages, and special improvement
districts are also a lien on the real estate, second only to the first lien of general taxes."
(citing NEB. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 77-209, 1917.01 (2006)); see also Echo Fin. v.
Peachtree Props., L.L.C., 864 N.W.2d 695, 699 (2015).
93. INA Group was decided in 2006. In 2011, Nebraska amended its statutes to include
an exception to the common law rule that foreclosure by a superior lienholder
extinguishes all junior lienholders: "The delivery of the sheriff's deed shall pass title
to the purchaser free and clear of all liens and interests of all persons who were parties
to the proceedings. . . excluding any lien on real estate for special assessments levied
by any sanitary and improvement district .... NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-1914
(West Supp. 2015).
94. INA Grp., 716 N.W.2d at 740.
95. Id. at 742.
96. See IDAHO CODE § 50-1008 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-11-4(1) to (2) (LexisNexis
2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 74.53(l)(a)-(b) (West 2011).
97. California's Water Districts typically contain statutory language that establishes cots
for remediating water violations as nuisance abatement costs, collectable as liens
which are added to the following year's annual taxes:
The amount of any costs incurred by the district in abating such a
nuisance upon real property shall be added to the annual taxes
next levied upon the real property subject to abatement and shall
2016
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As discussed below, the method of enforcement for these remediation
liens becomes the method in which property taxes are collected.
C. Enforcement of the Remediation Lien
Another attribute of remediation lien statutes is the method of
enforcing the lien. Most states decree that the lien shall be enforced
in the same manner as property taxes, while a minority establish a
distinct procedure from property taxes. For example, New
Hampshire's statute states that the remediation lien "may be levied
and collected in the same manner as provided.. . for tax liens."98
While many state statutes make reference to the manner and
procedure for the collection of tax liens, with superpriority for
remediation liens, there is little uniformity among those statutes in
the process they establish for enforcing property tax liens.99 Thus, tax
liens can be enforced by strict foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, non-
judicial foreclosure, a sale of the tax certificate and subsequent
foreclosure of the property, or sale of the tax certificate without the
need to foreclose.100  Additionally, states vary as to whether a
statutory right of redemption exists after foreclosure. Some states
require that two or more years of delinquent taxes accrue before a
foreclosure may begin, while other states do not require this waiting
period.1 1  The various procedures for tax sales are very often
inefficient, a circumstance that does not help the local governments
in need of recouping expenses they have incurred in curing blighted
properties. 102
States that do not lump enforcement of remediation liens with tax
liens usually conform to a standard procedure for enforcing property
liens in general.13 Arizona is one example of a state that gives its
local governments the power to execute their lien immediately: "A
city or town shall have the right to bring an action to enforce the
assessment in the superior court in the county in which the property is
constitute a lien upon that real property as of the same time and in
the same manner as does the tax lien securing those annual taxes.
CAL. WATER CODE § 31144.2(b) (West Supp. 2015).
98. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:9-a (LexisNexis 2010); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 2291(24) (Supp. 2015) (granting "a lien on the property in the same manner and
to the same extent as taxes assessed on the grand list, and all procedures and remedies
for the collection of taxes shall apply to the collection of those expenses").
99. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 772-73.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 775.
102. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1194.
103. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 22-11 l(A)(6) (West Supp. 2015).
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located at any time after the recording of the assessment .. 104
New Mexico, in a more streamlined approach, declares all municipal
liens (including those for remediation of blighted properties) to be
superior to all prior liens on the property except state and county
taxes"0 5, and then authorizes the lienholder to foreclose the lien in the
same manner as mortgages.10 6 The practical effect of a statute like
New Mexico's is that a municipality may begin the collection action
on its lien immediately after the lien is perfected.
Arkansas, in contrast, requires a multi-step process to secure a lien,
establish its superpriority, and collect it. 107 First, it requires seven
days notice to all other lienholders prior to remediation if the local
government wishes to establish its lien with superpriority.0° Next,
after work is completed, the local government must provide a second
notice to prior lienholders of the final amount of the lien. 09 A public
hearing is then held before the governing body of the municipality,
after which municipal lienholders seeking to obtain superpriority for
their liens must seek declaratory relief in a circuit court action."10
Once this process is complete, the local government may then
enforce the lien, either by foreclosing it or certifying the lien to the
tax collector so that it may be added to the tax rolls and collected as
delinquent property taxes.II
104. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-499(D) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added).
105. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-36-2 (LexisNexis 2004).
106. Id. § 3-364(B).
107. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-903 (Supp. 2015).
108. "If the city or town wishes to secure a priority clean-up lien, it shall provide seven (7)
business days' notice to lienholders before undertaking any work at the property." Id.
§ 14-54-903(c)(7)(A).
109. "If the city or town wishes to secure a priority clean-up lien after the work has been
completed, it shall provide second notice to the lienholders of record of the total
amount of the clean-up lien." Id. § 14-54-903(e)(1)(B).
110. Id. § 14-54-903(o.
If the city or town wishes to secure a first-priority status for any
priority clean-up lien created and imposed under this section, it
shall file an action with the circuit court within which the property
is located seeking a declaration that the clean-up lien is entitled to
priority over previously recorded liens and naming the holders of
the recorded liens as defendants.
Id. § 14-54-903(j)(1).
111. Id. § 14-54-904(a)(1) to (2)(B). The Arkansas statute is one of several that define
specific procedures for the collection ofremediation liens once they are perfected.
2016
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III. ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIONS TO SUPERPRIORITY LIENS
A. Constitutional Objections to Superpriority Will Fail.
The underlying legal principle behind a lien is that it secures a debt
owed by the owner of property to the lienor."12  As previously
discussed, the priority of liens is generally established based on the
order in time in which they were perfected."3 Given this, and the fact
that under state legislation a superpriority lienholder will have its
interests recognized ahead of earlier recorded liens,"l4 it has been
asserted that junior lienholders rights to due process of law have been
infringed upon by this arrangement."5 However, in the seminal cases
addressing the constitutionality of states' statutes granting
superpriority to governmental liens,"6 the courts have upheld the
superpriority lien statutes against challenges."7 If a statute is well-
drafted, and the superpriority lien is properly perfected, due process-
based objections to governmental lien superpriority are likely to
fail." 8
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits states
from depriving any person of property without "due process of
law."" 9  The first element of a due process argument is adequate
notice.120 State statutes that do not require notice to junior lienholders
112. "Essence of 'lien' at common law is right to retain possession of personal property
until a charge thereon for a debt or duty is satisfied, and ordinarily the lien is lost by
lienholder's voluntary and unconditional surrender of possession or control of the
property." Nature & Incidents in General, in LIENS, WEST'S A.L.R. DIGEST, § 1,
Westlaw ALRDG 239K1 (database updated Dec. 2015) (quoting Agnew v. Am. Ice
Co., 66 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1949)).
113. Priority of liens generally depends upon time that they attach to property involved.
Priorities, in LIENS, WEST'S A.L.R. DIGEST § 12, Westlaw ALRDG 239K12 (database
updated Dec. 2015) (citing In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust, 279 S.E.2d (N.C.
1981)).
114. Margaret Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on
Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1134 (1986).
115. Randone v. Appellate Dep't., 488 P.2d 13, 23 (Cal. 1971); see also Jonathan Remy
Nash, Environmental Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-Backed Securitization,
59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 127, 149-51 (2002).
116. This discussion incorporates the arguments and holdings of cases involving various
types of superliens, including mechanics' and environmental cleanup liens. The legal
theory in the area is germane to remediation liens in that they share the public purpose
as the other liens; therefore, the constitutional objections and responses are applicable
to remediation lien statutes.
117. See, e.g., Kessler v. Tarrats, 476 A.2d 326, 329, 332 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
118. See Nash, supra note 115, at 150.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Nash, supra note 115, at 149.
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before perfecting a superlien run the risk of a constitutional
challenge.12' The lack of due process argument will usually fail
regarding the superpriority of a remediation lien, however, because
all state statutes and local governments require that some level of
notice be given to the interested parties.
A second potential constitutional challenge is whether a superlien
statute constitutes a governmental taking.12  Although courts and
commentators have taken differing positions as to whether a
superpriority lien may be a governmental taking, even in a case
where a court found that a superpriority lien did constitute a taking,
the taking was deemed constitutional based on the notice
requirements of due process. 123 Two decided cases provide analyses
of constitutional objections that are relevant to the constitutionality of
remedial superpriority lien legislation. They involve types of liens
that are analogous to remediation liens: mechanics' liens and
environmental cleanup liens. 1
24
The New Jersey Superior Court found that an environmental
cleanup lien with superpriority did not constitute a governmental
taking.'25 Environmental cleanup liens are analogous to local
government's remediation liens in that both grant the government
power to enter privately held property for the purpose of cleanup or
otherwise bringing the property into compliance with a statute or
code.126  Many states have enacted legislation regarding the
contamination of real property by toxic or otherwise hazardous
waste.2 7  The environmental agencies charged with cleanup of
121. Id.
122. Id. at 149-50.
123. See Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 553 P.2d 637, 643 (Cal. 1976).
124. Mechanics' liens are statutory constructs, designed to protect a party from non-
payment for work or supplies for the improvement of real property. The mechanics'
lien is typically granted priority over all liens that are recorded subsequent to
commencement of work on the property, even if the mechanics' lien is not yet filed.
The mechanics' lien and remediation liens are similar in that they both secure
repayment of costs in improving a third party's real property. See infra notes 141-47
and accompanying text.
125. Kessler v. Tarrats, 476 A.2d 326, 332 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
126. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
127. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a (West 2015); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
5/11-31-1 (e) to -1(f) (West 2005); LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:2195(F)(2) (2000); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371
(2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20138(2) (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. §
82-4-239(5)(a), (c) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.1 lf(f), :10B-25.2 (West
2006); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0508 (McKinney 2008); 32 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5116(a)(1) (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 292.81 (West 2015).
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contaminated properties are permitted to lien the subject property for
the costs of cleanup, and in some states, those liens are granted
superpriority status.'28 In Kessler v. Tarrats, the Superior Court of
New Jersey held that an environmental cleanup lien with
superpriority did not constitute a governmental taking without just
compensation.129 The court's reasoning hinged on two factors-the
state's police power and the circumstances that led to the imposition
of the lien.130
First, the court noted that each state has "authority... to safeguard
the vital interests of its citizens."'' In Kessler, the State of New
Jersey had enacted legislation that provided for the cleanup of toxic
waste on property, including state action when the responsible parties
fail to abide by the statute. 132 The court added, "It cannot be disputed
that the State had the authority to clean up this property upon the
failure of those responsible to do so."'33 The court concluded that the
state action amounted to a restriction on the use of land pursuant to
the state's police power and not a taking for governmental use.
13 4
However, the circumstances under which the government was
required to take action to clean the property were equally relevant to
the court's holding.
The Kessler court explained that the state's involvement was solely
due to the presence of toxic materials on the property."' The state
had "the unquestioned authority ... to require abatement of a health
nuisance, and the ability . . . to close down a property or facility
which creates a public health menace."'36 The court noted that the
diminution of any security interest in the property should be
128. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 f(f) (West 2006).
129. Kessler, 476 A.2d at 328, 332 (interpreting § 58:10-23.11 f(f)).
130. Id. at 331-32.
131. Id. at 331 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)).
Another constitutional argument presented in Kessler was that the statute violated the
Contracts Clause of the Constitution, which prohibits state action that impairs parties'
obligations in contracts. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. The Kessler court relied on the
United States Supreme Court, which held that the prohibition "is not an absolute and
is not to be read 'with literal exactness like a mathematical formula."' Kessler, 476
A.2d at 331 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass 'n, 290 U.S. at 428); see also Tex. Bank
& Tr. Co. of Beaumont v. Smith, 192 S.W. 533 (Tex. 1917) ("Ordinarily a statutory
lien will not be given precedence over an existing and duly registered lien. But there
is no question as to the power of a legislature to give a statutory lien such priority
Where its object is to secure charges necessary for the preservation of the property.").
132. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 If.
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attributed to the party responsible for the contamination, and not the
government.137 The state took action only after the owner, having
been notified of the contamination, failed to take action.'38 The court
concluded:
The State did not take property, but rather assisted in its
enhancement by doing what the owners should have done
but did not do. There thus exists a right of reimbursement.
Such action inured to the benefit not only of the owner, but
all existing lienholders. Hence, the State's priority lien
status is warranted."
' 139
Thus, notably the court not only found that the superpriority
environmental cleanup lien was not a governmental taking, but it
found that the state was actually providing a benefit to all interested
parties.140
In contrast, the California Supreme Court reviewed mechanics'
liens and their relationship with the Fourteenth Amendment in
Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court4' and determined that a
superpriority lien was a governmental taking.'42 The Court stated, "A
'taking' of property under the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
any significant deprivation of a property interest . . . . "' It added
that physical seizure of property is not a requirement for the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply.'" The court reasoned that even if
the property owner retained possession of the property, the lien could
impair the owner's ability to sell or mortgage the property. 45 Based
on that reasoning, it held that the recording of a mechanics' lien
constituted a taking, requiring adherence to the principles of due
process. 146 However, even though the Connolly court held that the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
140. Id.
141. Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 553 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1976).
142. See id. at 644.
143. Id. at 642.
144. Id. at 643.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 644. A separate, but relevant, consideration is whether a lien attaches to other
property owned by the debtor. The court found that the California statutes:
[P]ermit laborers and materialmen to place a lien only on property
whose value they have enhanced by their labor, and to garnish
only accounts set aside to pay their claims. Hence in the present
case the admonition of Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, 416
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lien's superpriority constituted a taking, the court still allowed the
superpriority because the state's actions complied with due process
requirements. 147
The Kessler court's constitutional analysis should apply to
remediation liens. A local government becomes involved with a
property only upon its failure to abide by the code governing the safe
maintenance of real property.48  Dilapidated buildings, garbage or
debris, even overgrown weeds and brush, all present hazards to the
community and diminution in value to property. These conditions
are not the product of government action, just as in Kessler where the
State of New Jersey was not the party responsible for contamination
of the property at issue. 1419 A local government's action in
remediating blight is always preceded by notice to the owner or
interested parties and the opportunity to cure the defects. When those
parties have failed to take action, the state exercises its police power
to abate the hazardous condition, incurring costs in doing so. This
action enhances the property, and, in the words of the Kessler court,
"[t]here thus exists a right of reimbursement."' 50 Most importantly,
where a local government remediates blight from a property, the
benefit inures not only to the owner, but also to all existing
lienholders.15 1 Therefore, because the government involvement to
remediate a property is a benefit to the property owners, any
U.S. 600, 604, applies: that when the creditor has an interest in the
property seized, resolution of the due process question requires an
accommodation of the interests of both creditor and debtor.
Id. at 649. This distinction is significant because some states declare that a
remediation lien may be satisfied, should the subject property's value be insufficient,
by attachment o any property owned by the subject property's owner. See, e.g., N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:9(I1) (LexisNexis 2010). New Hampshire contains such a
provision, authorizing a municipality to "place a lien for the balance of the cost on any
other real property in the state that is owned by the same owner, which additional lien
may be levied and collected in the same manner as provided in RSA 80 for tax liens..
." Id. However, in an example of constitutional awareness and careful statutory
drafting, the statute specifically removes superpriority status from liens recorded
pursuant to that subsection, thereby avoiding what would likely give rise to a
constitutional challenge. Id.
147. The determination of a governmental taking does not automatically render state action
unconstitutional. Adequate notice and opportunity to object to the lien were key
reasons why the California court held the mechanics' lien statute valid. Connolly
Dev., Inc., 553 P.2d at 653-54.
148. See id. at 645-46.
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argument that remediation liens violate the constitutional prohibition
upon governmental taking should fail.
Even if a court were to follow California's reasoning in Connolly
that a superlien is a taking, the court could apply the test used in
Connolly to determine that the taking is justified provided the statute
accounts for notice to interested parties.5 2 However, it is more likely
that a court would find a remediation lien similar to an environmental
cleanup lien because, in both scenarios, the government is entering
private property to bring a property into compliance with a code. In
this case, a court will likely follow the Kessler decision and find that
the environmental cleanup lien is not a taking, but rather provides a
benefit to the interested parties.'53 In either scenario, however, the
constitutional challenge of a governmental taking will fail to prohibit
superpriority of the lien.
B. Lenders' Practical Objections to Superpriority Will Fail.
As we have seen, superpriority of a remediation lien impacts all
prior liens on the subject property. The equitable value of a lien-
like a first mortgage-is reduced by the value of the remediation
lien.'54  Mortgage lenders argue that granting superpriority to
remediation liens "prejudices lenders' ability to sell their loans on the
secondary market .... This harms the lending market, and in turn,
the housing market."'55 For reasons stated below, this assertion is
without merit.
Securitization is a critical element of residential mortgage
lending.56 The original mortgage lender often sells its rights to the
mortgage to a securitization promoter, who then bundles groups of
mortgages for sale as a security to investors.'57 This system relies on
calculation of risks, so mortgages may be valued correctly.5 8 That
calculation is grounded in predictability of lien priority.59 Superlien
statutes, it is argued, destroys this predictability because at any given
152. See Connolly Dev., Inc., 553 P.2d at 643.
153. See Kessler, 476 A.2d at 332.
154. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Florida Bankers Ass'n in Support of Respondent's
Answer Brief at 1-2, City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924
(Fla. 2013) (No. SCI 1-830), 2011 WL 6100873 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
155. Id. at 1.
156. Nash, supra note 115, at 177.
157. For a detailed overview of mortgage-backed securities, see id. at 138-45.
158. Id. at 179-80.
159. Id. at 180.
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time, a mortgage's security interest could be usurped by a
remediation lien. 1
60
Complaints over lost equity are unconvincing. Lenders would like
to present he subordination of their lien in a vacuum-noting simply
that they have lost value in their security interest. Remediation liens,
however, are not just liens that have appeared from some transaction
between the local government and the property owner unrelated to
the first mortgage holder. Instead, remediation liens are the product
of a local government improving the condition and value of the
property, to both the owner and lender's benefit. To argue against the
proper reimbursement of local governments' expenses is to support
the idea that local governments should clean up blighted properties at
their own expense so that lenders can ultimately sell them and reap
the benefits. The alternative is for local governments to do nothing
and let blight expand in communities, an approach which diminishes
the value of all properties in the area (including all lenders' security
interests).
Moreover, the impact of superliens is generally overstated in
arguments against them. In the context of environmental superliens,
commentators surmise that the value of a lender's security interest is
less at issue than their interest in taking ownership at all.'6' Where
remediation of a property's hazardous condition would not occur but
for a superlien statute, it serves all parties' interests, including the
lender's, to have such a statute in effect.
62
While environmental liens usually involve a greater scope of
contamination and higher costs than do liens for remediation of
nuisances or blight, the two areas are analogous. 163 In each instance,
160. Arguing against the validity of a municipal superlien statute, the Florida Bankers
Association states, "It is not unrealistic to predict that home lending could shut down
in Florida if these ordinances are deemed valid due to the level of uncertainty
superpriority liens create." Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 154, at 13.
161. Rather, Budnitz and Chaitman argue that the "greatest concern"
for lenders arising out of superlien statutes is "the lien on business
revenues that might otherwise be used to satisfy the business's
debt to its lender." This argument persuasively suggests that
superlien statutes may cause commercial mortgage lenders to
increase substantially the cost of borrowed funds to insure against
this increased risk. At the same time, this argument implies by
omission that residential lenders will not experience a similar
motivation.
Nash, supra note 115, at 168 (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 170.
163. While, true, this notion is not universal. Dilapidated structures that require demolition
can drastically diminish the value of property.
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the defect on the property presents a hazard to public, the interested
parties have failed to remediate the issue, and the local government
has expended resources in correcting the problem. If there is any
diminution in the value of a lender's security interest, it occurs when
the property becomes blighted, not when a local government perfects
a lien for reimbursement of costs associated with improving the value
of that property.64
Because the risk of a property's value becoming diminished due to
blight exists irrespective of a remediation superlien statute, the
predictability of that risk is already at issue in a blighted area for
mortgage-backed securities. Superlien statutes increase the
likelihood that a local government will take action to prevent blight.
In the aggregate, this not only aids the value of the subject property,
but the surrounding properties also. Therefore, a remediation
superlien statute actually benefits mortgage lenders across a state
since they have some assurance that the value of their security
interests, including their interests in properties that remain in good
standing, will not be diminished due to creeping blight. For these
reasons, the notion that superlien statutes would "dramatically alter
the mortgage market" is misleading.165
V. A PROPERLY DRAFTED REMEDIATION SUPERPRIORITY
STATUTE CAN CURE BLIGHT.
A properly drafted superpriority statute for remediation liens can
dramatically improve a local government's ability to cure blight.
However, when there is no state statute on point, the local
governments are left without guidance or authority to properly
remove blight and recover their costs. This first section of Part IV
will take a look at a case of what can happen when a state is silent on
this issue.166 The second section of Part IV will highlight the success
of a few states that have a statute in place to allow for superpriority of
remediation liens.67 Finally, the third section of Part V will analyze
the three attributes discussed in Part II and propose model attributes
for a remediation statute.1
68
164. Kessler v. Tarrats, 476 A.2d 326, 332 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
165. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 154, at 13.
166. See infra Part IV.A.
167. See infra Part IV.B.
168. See infra Part IV.C.
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A. Florida's Legislature Failed to Create a Remediation
Superpriority Statute and Local Governments Cannot Effectively
Cure Blighted Communities.
When a state is silent as to whether the local government has
authority to create a superpriority remediation lien, the local
government does not have the tool necessary to cure blight with
proper reimbursement. Moreover, the owner and the lienholders
have no appropriate incentive to maintain the property so as to
prevent a need for code enforcement. In states with large amounts of
REO properties,69 lender owners will simply stall the maintenance of
the property as long as possible because there will be no threat that a
code enforcement lien for cleanup of a property will diminish their
security interest. The importance of having a state statute in place
addressing superpriority for remediation liens was highlighted by the
recent Florida Supreme Court decision in City of Palm Bay v. Wells
Fargo, N.A. 70 In City of Palm Bay, the Florida Supreme Court was
called to address whether Palm Bay, a municipality in the state of
Florida, was permitted to enact local legislation that established its
municipal code enforcement liens as having superpriority status.7'
The Florida Supreme Court examined three Florida statutes that
address lien priority before holding Palm Bay's ordinance invalid.7 '
Two of the statutes are recording statutes, which mandate the
procedure that clerks of the court must follow to record official
records; the third requires that all official records be recorded
according to statute to be valid against subsequent creditors or
purchasers without notice.173  The Court found that the municipal
ordinance allowing superpriority of a local government lien
conflicted with the recording statutes.174  There was no express
authority granted at the state level for a local government to create a
lien that had superpriority.
175
Florida, like many other states, was hit very hard by the housing
market crash and the ensuing foreclosure crisis, and there are a record
169. Real Estate Owned (REO) Inventory is defined as bank-owned homes as a result of
foreclosure. Stephen M. Dane, Tara K. Ramchandani & Anne P. Bellows,
Discriminatory Maintenance of REO Properties as a Violation of the Federal Fair
Housing Act, 17 CUNY L. REV. 383, 383 (2014).
170. 114 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2013).
171. Id. at 926.
172. Id. at 927 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.222(2) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
695.01(1), .11 (West 1994)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 928-29.
175. Id. at 927.
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number of abandoned and REO properties in the state.17 6
Unfortunately, the decision in City of Palm Bay produced a result in
which local governments are now blocked from enacting superlien
legislation, not because the state legislature has expressly preempted
it, but because of an opinion focused on statutes which are "scattered
and separately enacted."'77  Junior lienholders, including mortgage
lenders, can now ignore blight with impunity because remediation
liens can be eliminated through foreclosure. 178 Local governments in
Florida hesitate to get involved in rehabilitating blighted properties
because many such properties are still lacking equity, and it is
unlikely the government will ever recoup the expenses invested.'79 In
an age of austerity and shrinking budgets, many properties will
therefore remain in a blighted condition.
B. Louisiana Successfully Equips New Orleans to Cure Blight with a
State Superpriority Remediation Statute.
Several states have proven that enacting a superpriority remediation
statute can help stop the spread of blight in a community. One
example is the rehabilitation of New Orleans in the years following
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. By 2010, almost one-quarter of the
residential properties of New Orleans had become blighted. 80
However, by 2014, New Orleans "now is considered a national model
for blight reduction."'8' The New Orleans model relies on the city's
ability to take action against owners of blighted properties. The
176. "In the first 10 months of 2009, Florida already had 335,994 foreclosure filings, with
a clearance rate of 60 percent-likely to top 400,000 cases for the year. Compare that
with just three years ago, when foreclosure filings were 73,878 and the clearance rate
was 79 percent." Jesse H. Diner, Averting the "Tipping Point of Dysfunction ", 84
FLA. B.J. 6, 6 (2010); see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
177. City ofPalm Bay, 114 So. 3d at 931.
178. Because their costs are unlikely to be reimbursed, local governments will be less
likely to take action to remediate properties, leaving communities to endure the blight.
179. See Miho Favela, 5.1 Million U.S. Properties Still Remain in Negative Equity,
WORLD PROP. J. (June 17, 2015, 9:05 AM), http://www.worldpropertyjoumal.com/rea
l-estate-news/united-states/tampa-real-estate-news/negative-home-equity-report-201 5-
corelogic-underwater-homes-negative-home-loans-under-equitied-homes-frank-
nothaft-anand-nallathambi-9168.php (noting Florida had the second highest
percentage of mortgaged properties in negative equity through the first quarter of
2015).
180. Charles Chieppo, New Orleans' Winning Strategy in the War on Blight, GOVERNING
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.goveming.com/blogs/bfc/col-new-orleans-blightstat-
vacant-dilapidated-property.html (reporting the estimated figure of blighted properties
in 2010 was 43,755).
181. Id.
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remediation superlien statute in Louisiana ensures that the city has
the financial resources to remediate properties. As Deputy Mayor
and Chief Administrative Office Andy Kopplin explained, "Before,
owners of blighted properties just ignored city fines, and peer
pressure didn't change their behavior . . . But once they know
you'll seize their property, they get religion."' 8 2 Acquiring property
is feasible for a city only when the property is not encumbered by a
mortgage that exceeds the value of the property, which is common
for properties that require remediation. The knowledge that
ownership or a security interest is at stake has been sufficient
motivation for owners and lienholders to remediate properties rather
than lose them, which is the primary goal of the superlien statute.
Louisiana established superpriority for remediation liens at the state
level. Municipalities may impose civil fines for property that is
blighted, abandoned or otherwise poses a danger to the public as a
result of housing code violations.'83 A separate statute grants
municipalities the authority to remove unsanitary weeds and growth
from a property and the sidewalks around it. 184 Most importantly,
municipalities have a lien for any maintenance, removal or
demolition it conducts on a derelict property.'85 The Louisiana
legislature reiterated the superiority of all of these liens in the statute
regarding lien priority. 8 6  The result is that municipalities in
182. Id.
183. LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:2575 (2011). The statute distinguishes between municipalities
with populations of seventy thousand or more and those with populations of less than
seventy thousand. For those under seventy thousand, code violations do not qualify as
instances where fines would apply.
184. LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:5062 (2009).
185. The parish or municipality has a privilege and lien upon an
immovable and its improvements, and the owner is personally
liable for:
(1) The cost to the parish or municipality of maintenance of the
immovable or improvements; and
(2) The cost to the parish or municipality of demolishing or
removing, or both, a building or other structure situated upon the
immovable or improvements, and all attorney fees incurred by the
parish or municipality in connection with such demolition or
removal.
Id. § 33:4766(A).
186. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821 (2007). The statute prioritizes the ranking and privileges
granted and imposed by sections 9:4801 and 9:4802 in the following order:
Privileges for ad valorem taxes or local assessments for public
improvements against the property, liens, and privileges granted
in favor of parishes for reasonable charges imposed on the
property under R.S. 33:1236, liens and privileges granted in favor
Vol. 45
Superpriority of Remediation Liens
Louisiana can undertake remediation of blighted properties with the
confidence that they can recover their costs. As a result, since 2010,
the city of New Orleans has reduced blight by thirty percent, and it
has recovered $3.4 million through the lien foreclosure process.
8 7
Moreover, there has been a reduction of approximately 13,000
blighted properties as of early 2014, and as of this writing, the New
Orleans blight reduction program remains active and effective.'88
Another example of a successful use of remediation liens is the
work of a community task force in Collier County, Florida that was
initiated in 2008, prior to the ruling in City of Palm Bay v. Wells
Fargo. Collier County formed "five community task force teams,
which [we]re comprised of code enforcement, attorneys, law
enforcement officers, fire district officials, utilities, Domestic
Animals Services, civic associations, homeowners associations and
other organizations."'' 89 Its focus was on compliance, and the task
force worked with banks to stem the tide of blight.190 It also enacted
a local ordinance that established superpriority for the county's
remediation liens, although that ordinance subordinated the lien to
first mortgages.19' The effort resulted in banks effecting repairs on
over 1,000 properties, spending about $1.5 million in the process.192
The County received national recognition for its achievements in
of municipalities for reasonable charges imposed on property
under R.S. 33:4752, 4753, 4754, 4766, 5062, and 5062.1, and
liens and privileges granted in favor of a parish or municipality
for reasonable charges imposed on the property under R.S.
13:2575 are first in rank and concurrent regardless of the dates of
recordation or notation of such liens and privileges in any public
record, public office, or public document.
Id. § 9:4821(1).
187. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, BLIGHT REDUCTION REPORT, 4, 20-21, 23 (Jan. 2014),
http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Performance-and-Accountability/Initiatives-and-
Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Report-web.pdf/ [hereinafter BLIGHT REDUCTION
REPORT]. New Orleans reduced blighted homes by 10,000 from 2010 to 2014. Other
jurisdictions with superlien for code enforcement include: 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/21.3 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-48-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 292.81 (West 2006).
188. See BLIGHT REDUCTION REPORT, supra note 187, at 4, 23; see also BlightSTAT, supra
note 4.
189. Kelly Farrell, Neighborhood Blight: Agencies in Collier, Lee Grapple with Decline
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combating blight. 93 Unfortunately, due to the 2014 Florida Supreme
Court ruling in City of Palm Bay, this type of ordinance is no longer
authorized in the state until the state legislature specifically enacts a
state statute to authorize local governments to create liens with
superpriority status.
C. Model Attributes of a Superpriority Remediation Statute
1. States Should Mandate Superpriority for Remediation Liens.
The first consideration is whether states should enact a remediation
lien statute that applies statewide, or merely authorize local
govermnents to enact their own legislation to apply locally, if they so
choose. While the latter may appear to benefit local governments
because it provides them wide discretion, that approach creates more
of a burden than a benefit for them. It requires local governments to
expend time and resources creating systems for identification of a
violation, what actions it can take, and what method to use to collect
on the lien. A statewide system, on the other hand, provides a default
framework that every local government can utilize. Additionally, as
evidenced by the variety of systems that currently exist across the
country, the systems within a state may well be equally varied. This
leads to the second problem with giving local governments' full
discretion: a lack of predictability.
When the state gives the local government full discretion as to how
to implement a remediation superpriority lien, a lack of predictability
is problematic for owners, lenders, and courts. The absenc6 of a
unified statewide system leaves residents, courts and lenders with the
task of navigating the differences between local jurisdictions. As
discussed above in Part III, an argument against superpriority of liens
that lenders assert is that their exposure becomes unpredictable when
liens subsequent o their security interest are permitted to jump them
in priority.9 4  Allowing local governments discretion to grant
superpriority to remediation liens gives this lender objection more
validity since municipalities may enact such an ordinance at any
time; and there may be no consistency between cities on the matter.
Additionally, where a statewide mandate for superpriority of
remediation liens does not exist, lenders could target those
municipalities that have enacted such ordinances by withholding
193. In 2009, Collier County was awarded the National Association of Counties
Achievement Award. Id.
194. See supra Part III.
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loans within its borders.95 Such an option does not exist where a
superlien statute applies statewide (except, of course, in the unlikely
event that a lender wishes to stop loans throughout the entire state). 1
96
Similarly, owners who move to different local jurisdictions
throughout a state would need to be aware of the distinct powers of
each local government to ensure they are aware of the risks involved
with failing to repair code violations.
A statute that mandates a statewide system for remediation of
blight and the reimbursement of costs is the most effective means of
accomplishing the state's goal. This legal regime will give local
governments the power to immediately act to remove blight with the
protection of a superpriority lien, without their having to expend
resources to draft additional legislation to achieve their goal.
This need not mean that all discretion must be removed from local
governments. Throughout the suggestions advanced below, there are
facets of the system that I contend are best left to the local
governments. Nonetheless, the state statute should convey the intent
of each part of the process so that local governments are not left to
decipher the statute on their own. The best version of a remediation
superlien statute accounts for the differences in local governments
while giving a directive that applies to all of them. How to define
blight, or what level the community could be involved in identifying
blight, can be left open to local government discretion. 97
195. Richmond, California is one place where financial institutions threatened to withhold
lending following legislation deemed harmful to their interests. Richmond, beset with
foreclosures and blight, created a plan to use eminent domain to purchase loans on
properties at risk of foreclosure, abandonment or blight, due mainly to the loan
exceeding the value of the property. The plan received the attention of Wells Fargo,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who all opposed the plan to the extent of threatening to
stop lending in Richmond or any other city that attempted a similar legislation. Shaila
Dewan, Eminent Domain: A Long Shot Against Blight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmond-california-a-long-shot-
against-blight.html?_r-0.
196. Such an occurrence took place in Georgia in 2002. A law was passed which limited
high-risk loans and loan reselling, and imposed harsh penalties upon every party
involved in a loan should it violate any laws. The mortgage industry in Georgia fell
by over fifteen percent and the legislators were quickly pressured into gutting the law.
Arielle Kass, Dismantled Law Could Have Cushioned Recession 's Fall, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Apr. 29, 2013, 3:12 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/business/realestate/disma
ntled-law-could-have-cushioned-recessions-fal/nXbcs/.
197. Community involvement in rehabilitating blighted neighborhoods can be incredibly
effective. Because of the distinct nature of individual communities, whether to
involve the community in cleanup is something left to be decided at the local level.
For a more detailed discussion on the benefits of the community working together
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For example, the pertinent Georgia statute creates the opportunity
for community involvement by requiring each local government to
appoint a public officer to whom complaints may be made by
residents.'98 Upon receiving at least five complaints, the public
officer must begin the process of taking action against the property.99
By providing specifically for a non-governmental complaint process,
it signals to the community that remediation of blight is a joint task
between the local government and the community.0
A procedure for appropriate notice should also be expressly
included in the state statute that is mandated statewide. Both the
party or parties who must be served, and what manner of service is
effective must be specified.201  Failure to carefully consider these
issues could create constitutional issues for the statute as noted
supra.°2 Service of notice for violations of blight statutes must
always be made on the owner of the property. The owner is
ultimately responsible for the condition of the property and, should
the local government remediate the property and foreclose a lien for
its costs, the owner would be deprived of ownership. However,
because the statute anticipates superpriority for a remediation lien
should the local government take action, all lienholders should be
afforded the opportunity to cure the defect before the local
government acts. Therefore, if a superlien is imposed on the
property, the lienholders whose security interests are affected must be
given the opportunity to remediate the condition and avoid the local
government's involvement.20 3
with the local government to cure blight, see Uzdavines, supra note 2, at 161, 163,
165, 190-91.
198. GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-9(a)(2) (2014).
199. Id. § 41-2-9(a)(3).
200. See Uzdavines, supra note 2, at 187-90, for a detailed discussion on how community
involvement benefits the remediation process.
201. "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
202. Notwithstanding the favorable treatment superlien statutes have received, like in
Kessler, above, the case law on the subject is sparse. Legislators would be wise to
take every precaution against future litigation over the constitutional issues
surrounding superliens, rather than rely on the few friendly cases that would provide
mere suggestion and not precedential authority.
203. This logic was important to the court in Kessler: the superlien represented not a
government intrusion, but the reimbursement of costs associated with the owner's
failure to take action in curing violations on the property. Kessler v. Tarrats, 476
A.2d 326, 332 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). By notifying all lienholders prior to
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The prescribed method of service should mirror the state's civil
procedure for service of court actions. This requirement is more
burdensome than the service currently permitted in some states,
which includes simply mailing the notice to the subject property and
the lienholder's address listed on recorded liens or judgments.
However, the burden is not unduly onerous, and it has considerable
benefit for the local government.2°4 Mailed notices are not always
received. If the goal in these situations is that someone other than the
local government remediate the property, requiring additional steps to
give notice will help achieve that goal. By ensuring that the owner
and all interested parties receive notice, the likelihood that someone
other than the government will take action to cure the blight will
increase.
2. Remediation Liens Should Be Given Co-Equal Priority with Tax
Liens and Protected from Being Extinguished.
A state statute that mandates superpriority of the lien must also
declare the lien's level of superpriority. The statute should state that
the lien is prior to all other claims on the property except those for
general property taxes, co-equal with the most recent lien for general
property taxes, and not extinguishable by foreclosure of a general
property tax lien. The Nevada statute for nuisance abatement liens is
an excellent example of how this can be accomplished. It provides
that:
[T]he expense of removal is a lien upon the property upon
which the nuisance is located. The lien must:
(a) Be perfected by recording with the county recorder a
statement by the city clerk of the amount of expenses due
and unpaid and describing the property subject to the lien.
(b) Be coequal with the latest lien thereon to secure the
payment of general taxes.
a local government's cleanup, the constitutional argument against superpriority is
further diminished by permitting those lienholders the opportunity to avoid
government involvement.
204. By mandating that the state's civil procedure rules for service of process apply, the
statute provides stability and familiarity within the system. It obviates the need to
come up with a new system of service, and should litigation arise over proper service,
courts are well-informed on the rules, along with whatever precedential guidance its
courts have promulgated over the years. Rather than creating new body of law,
parties may rely on the well-established jurisprudence in the area to guide them.
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(c) Not be subject to extinguishment by the sale of any
property because of the nonpayment of general taxes.
(d) Be prior and superior to all liens, claims, encumbrances
and titles other than the liens of assessments and general
taxes.205
That statute is comprehensive in establishing the priority of the lien
and protecting the lien once it is perfected. Notably, it states that it is
both "prior and superior," that its priority is over "liens, claims,
encumbrances and titles[,] ' ' 206 and that the lien is coequal with
property taxes and not extinguished by a foreclosure of the same.2 °7
It also provides for a simple yet clear procedure for perfecting the
lien.
The practical effect of this type of clause is more important than it
may seem. Because there are usually many problems with a blighted
property, remediation liens do not exist in a vacuum. A blighted
property may have judgment liens, first and second mortgages in
default, code enforcement violations, nuisance orders (for those
jurisdictions that bifurcate them from code violations), an unpaid
condominium or homeowner's association lien, and unpaid ad
valorem taxes. With ad valorem property taxes always in first
position in the hierarchy of liens, a foreclosure of the property tax
typically wipes out all liens on the property. The ability of local
governments to fund cleanup of blighted properties hinges on their
ability to recoup those costs. Without protection from
extinguishment, as can be found in the Nevada statute,08 local
governments would often find themselves with superliens that are
still eliminated due to foreclosure. They would thus be unable to
continue to bear the costs of remediating properties, effectively
defeating the purpose of the statutes. Therefore, a statute mandating
a remediation lien, which is co-equal with general property taxes and
cannot be extinguished by a property tax foreclosure, is essential for
protecting the local government's lien.
3. Remediation Superliens Should Be Enforced in the Same Manner
as Real Property Liens.
Once the lien is perfected, the statute must mandate the manner in
which the lien may be enforced. As discussed, many states authorize
205. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 266.335(3) (LexisNexis 2011).
206. Id. § 266.335(3)(d). A statute that fails to cover all potential property interests invites
challenges from those interests not covered.
207. Id. § 266.335(3)(b)-(c).
208. Id. § 266.335.
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enforcement of remediation liens in the same manner as general
property taxes.20 9 In most states, foreclosure of a tax lien can only
occur after multiple years of delinquency.10 This is not an effective
method for local governments to recoup their expenses. A statute
authorizing local governments to remediate blight must provide a lien
enforcement method that is efficient while protecting the interests of
all interested parties.
Additionally, a statute that creates multiple steps to enforcement,
like the one in Arkansas,21' requires a local government to spend
considerable resources to recoup its costs for remediating blight.2
The complexity of the foreclosure action alone is enough to dissuade
many municipalities from exercising their power to remediate blight,
and requiring an additional civil action merely to establish
superpriority of the lien only adds to the burden. Additionally, the
length of time that must expire between the local government
incurring the expense of remediation and the reimbursement of those
costs creates budgeting issues for local governments. Having to carry
remediation costs for years, with little indication of if or when those
costs will be recovered, makes the entire process unpalatable,
particularly for smaller local governments.
The enforcement method that best balances the interests of all
parties is the process by which real property liens are foreclosed
within the state. States have already deemed their system for
foreclosure of liens to be an equitable one, and the civil procedure for
enforcing a lien will be well established under that arrangement. The
main distinction between states will be whether the foreclosure
procedure is judicial or non-judicial.
209. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
211. As we have seen in Arkansas, the local government must provide notice to all
interested parties twice, file a circuit court action to establish its superpriority, and
then file another civil action to foreclose the lien. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 14-54-903
(Supp. 2015).
212. The notice requirement between states varies; some, like Arkansas, deem it sufficient
to mail notice to the lienholder's address listed in the public records. Id. § 14-54-
903(c)(7)(B). Other states require service akin to civil procedure, which could
involve the often arduous task of publication for those parties who cannot be served
personally. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-B:4 (LexisNexis 2010). Even in states that
permit mailing notice, publication may be necessary to serve unknown or non-resident
parties. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-902 (Supp. 2015).
2016
UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW
Non-judicial foreclosures are a shorter process, essentially placing
the burden of litigation on the defaulting party.213 For example, in
California, a non-judicial foreclosure could take as little as four
months.214 In judicial foreclosures, although a literal reading of the
pertinent rules of civil procedure might lead one to conclude that the
process could be completed in just a few months, in actuality, the
process usually takes between twelve and thirty-six months.215 Even
uncontested matters rely on clogged court dockets for a summary
judgment hearing, and sale dates are commonly set sixty to ninety
days from the date of the hearing.1 6  Therefore, in judicial
foreclosure states, remediation superlien statutes should include two
sections that expedite the enforcement stage.
First, the statute should provide that in any civil litigation, the
remediation lien is prima facie evidence of indebtedness. New
Mexico's statute is an example of this: "At the trial of any case
foreclosing any lien, the recitals of the lien or other evidence of
indebtedness shall be received in evidence as prima facie true. '217
While New Mexico's statute states, "At the trial of any case
foreclosing any lien," a more complete statute would read "In any
civil action.218
Second, the statute should authorize a fast-track procedure to
expedite the foreclosure process. When utilizing this option, the
lienholder should be permitted to request from the court an order to
show cause for the entry of a final judgment of foreclosure. The
process should work as follows: (1) the lienholder must file a request
for an order to show cause; (2) the court must immediately review the
court file to determine that the complaint is verified, properly alleges
213. In a non-judicial foreclosure, the property owner is served with a notice of default,
and it is incumbent upon the owner to take action to stop the foreclosure, as opposed
to a non-judicial foreclosure where the lienholder must progress litigation. CAL. Cw.
CODE § 2924(c) (West 2012).
214. California permits a non-judicial sale approximately ninety days from the recordation
of a notice of default. Id. § 2924(a)(1)(D)(2).
215. The time it takes to foreclose can be attributed to both the plaintiff's role in moving
the case, but also the dates assigned by the court for litigation milestones like final
judgment hearings, trial dates, and sale dates. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the
Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a
Proposalfor Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 639, 669 (1997).
216. Jurisdictions, of course, vary in the availability of hearings and sale dates. The salient
point is that there are variables outside of the statutes and parties control that affect
the length of time it takes to accomplish a judicial foreclosure.
217. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-36-4(B) (LexisNexis 2004).
218. Id. This would cover summary judgment, along with any other litigation that might
arise out of the subject property.
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a cause of action, and has attached to it a copy of a valid, recorded
lien; (3) the court will then issue to all other parties to the action an
order to show cause as to why a final judgment should not be
entered;2 19 and (4) upon the other parties waiving the right to be
heard, or the court determining that the parties have not evidenced
sufficient cause to avoid a final judgment, the court will promptly
enter a final judgment without a hearing. This procedure will allow
local governments to expedite its reimbursement while still affording
the other interested parties the opportunity to be heard.
While the remediation lien summary foreclosure option will
expedite the normal process of foreclosure, it is likely that this
streamlined approach will still effectively balance the interests of the
owner and lienholders against the interest of the local government. If
the remediation process has reached this point, it is unlikely that the
interested parties are really "interested" because proper notice has
already been received and action was not taken to cure the blight. It
makes little sense to require a local government to undergo a year-
long foreclosure process, occupying hearing times and municipal and
judicial resources, when an expedited process would accomplish the
same goal with less time and expense. Additionally, all of the
standard evidentiary requirements of a mortgage foreclosure are not
necessary in a local government lien foreclosure.22 0 In a remediation
lien foreclosure proceeding, the lien is the only pertinent document;
and while the municipality's alleged remediation costs could be
incorrect, or the lien improperly executed, those errors may be easily
raised in a response to a show cause order.22' Following the state's
general lien foreclosure process, while also allowing for a
remediation lien summary foreclosure proceeding to streamline the
process, will therefore create less uncertainty in the process, while
simultaneously promoting an efficient means of reimbursing the local
government.
CONCLUSION
Blight can occur for many reasons including economic disasters,
natural disasters, and population migration, among others. When a
state is left unprepared to deal with blight, the entire state may be in
danger of experiencing spreading hazardous conditions that affect its
219. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.10 (West 1994 & Supp. 2015). That statute applies to all
foreclosures and lienholders thereto.
220. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
221. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.10.
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residents when property values plummet and property owners lose
any equity they may have realized. However, when a state is
proactive and has an effective remediation superlien statute in place,
the state can incentivize property owners or lienholders to eliminate
blight or else risk of losing their interest in the property through
foreclosure of a superior lien. If the owners or lienholders still fail to
act, the local government has the power to step in and cure the blight,
and recoup its expenses because of the superpriority status. Looking
at states like Louisiana, one can see the success of a well-drafted
statute that protects local governments dealing with blight on a
massive scale.22  Unfortunately, the Louisiana statute was only
enacted after Hurricane Katrina, and so it took several years to see
the removal of blight and stabilization of New Orleans. When a state
has such a statute in place before a disaster occurs, its local
governments can act swiftly to cure blight before it spreads with
devastating consequences for the state's communities and their
inhabitants.
222. See supra Part IV.B.
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